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ABSTRACT 
Given n attributes, it is shown that if two subsets of 
these attributes overlap and are each utility independent 
of their respective complements, then their union, inter- 
section, symmetric difference, and two differences are 
each utility independent of their complements. A chain- 
ing theorem using this result indicates how to simplify 
the assessment of a multiattribute utility function to 
the maximum extent possible, subject to any specific set 
of utility independence assumptions. 

1. INTRODUCTION 
This paper presents some general results which permit one 
to decompose multiattribute utility functions. Given a set of 
attributes X E {X OIXII...IXn~I we illustrate how arbitrary sets 
of utility independence assumptions among the Xi, i = 1, ..., n 
imply a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function of the form 
where xi is a specific amount of Xi, h is a scalar valued 
function, and u. (x.) is a utility function over Xi. These 
1 1  
results relate to forms of (1) which have been derived for 
specific sets of preference assumptions by ~ishburn [1,2,31, 
Meyer [9], Pollak [10], Raiffa [I 1 I and Keeney [5,6,7]. Note 
from (1) that xo plays a different role than the other xi. 
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 
defines terms and specifies our notation. A basic result 
relating two overlapping utility independence assumptions is 
given in Section 3. This is the building block for the main 
result of the paper in Section 4. Section 5 discusses the 
relevance of the results. The results in this paper are com- 
pletely analogous to those of Gorman [4], who used the 
riskless analog to utility independence. He referred to this 
as separability. In this paper, we will call it preferential 
independence. 
2. NOTATION 
Let the consequence space XoxX1 x ... xXn represent a closed 
and bounded rectangular subset of a finite dimensional Euclidean 
space. Each Xi may be a vector or scalar attribute, implying that 
x may be either a vector or a scalar. Then x E (xo,xl, ..., xn) i 
is a consequence. We are interested in specifying functional 
forms of the utility function u(x) that are consistent with 
various sets of assumptions about the decision maker's prefer- 
ences. It is assumed that u(x) is continuous in each xi. 
Given the complete set of attributes X = {X~,X~,...,X,}, we 
will refer to any two subsets Y1 and Y2 which partition X as 
complementary sets of attributes. The complement of Y will be 
designated as 7. 
Definition. Attribute Y, where Y C XI is utility independent 
(UI) of its complement 7 if the conditional preference order 
for lotteries involving only changes in the levels of attributes 
in Y does not depend on the levels at which the attributes in 
7 are held fixed. If Y is utility independent of 7, then, 
since utility functions and unique up to positive affine 
transformations, 
u(y,y) = f (7) + g(y)u(y,yl) , for all y and y , (2) 
where g(y) > 0 and y' is an arbitrarily chosen specific amount 
- 
0 .  Y .  Rather than repeatedly saying that Y is utility independent 
of its complement 7 we will simply write Y is UI. 
We will set the origin of the utility function by 
where yo and yo are least preferred levels of Y and ?. Then, 
0 0 - by evaluating (2) at y , we find f (y) = u(y ,y), so condition 
(2) can be written as 
where we have chosen to set y '  in (2) equal to yo. Equation 
( 4 )  will be used in our proofs. 
Definition. Attribute Y, where Y C X, is preferentially 
independent (PI) of its complement Y if the preference order 
of consequences involving only changes in the levels in Y 
does not depend on the levels at which attributes in Y are 
held fixed. 
Preferential independence implies the conditional indif- 
ference curves over Y do not depend on attributes Y .  The con- 
cept concerns the decision maker's preferences for consequences 
where no uncertainty, is involved. By definition, it follows 
that if Y is UI, then Y is PI. The converse is not necessari- 
ly true. This relationship can be seen by noting that de- 
generate lotteries, those involving no uncertainty, are the 
same things as a consequence. Hence, the preferential in- 
dependence condition could be stated in terms of the preference 
order for degenerate lotteries only, and since the utility 
independence condition holds for all lotteries, the former is 
implied by the latter. Utility independence is the stronger 
condition. 
A result linking preferential independence and utility 
independence which we will use is 
Lemma 1. Given three attributes {x~,X~,X~}, if {x1,X2} is 
preferentially independent of Xo and if X1 is utility indepen- 
dent of {X~,X~}, then { x ~ , X ~ }  is utility independent of Xo. 
A proof of this result is found in Keeney [ 7 1 .  
3. FGZLATIONSHIPS AMONG UTILITY INDEPENDENCE ASSUMPTIONS 
If Y C X and Y is UI, the order of the UI condition is 
defined as the number of Xi's in Y. We are interested in 
implying higher order utility independence conditions from 
lower order conditions. 
Definition. Let Y1 and Y2 be subsets of X E {X0,X1,X2,...,Xn~. 
Attributes Y1 and Y2 overlap if their intersection is not 
empty and if neither includes the other. 
Theorem 1. Let Y1 and Y2 be overlapping attributes included 
in X E {X O,X1,...,Xn}. If Y1 and Y2 are each UI, then 
(i) Y1 u Y 2 ,  the union of Y1 and Y2, is UI, 
(ii) Y1 0 Y2, the intersection of Y1 and Y2, is UI, 
(iii) (Yl n 7,) LJ (7, n Y,), the symmetric difference of 
Y, and Y2, is UI, 
(iv) Y, n f2 and Y1 n Y2, the differences, are each UI. 
Note before proof. If utility independence is replaced by the 
weaker preferential independence in both the premise and result 
of Theorem 1, we have Gorman's theorem [41. 
Proof. Since Xi can designate a vector attribute, the general 
case can be proven by considering the special case where 
X = {X 0 ,X 1 IX21X3}, Y1 = {X1,X2}. and Y2 = {x~,X~}, and where 
Y1 and Y2 are each assumed to be UI. Since UI implies PI, each 
set of attributes in (i) through (iv) is PI using Gorman's 
theorem. We now show that XI, X2, and Xj are each UI and the 
proof follows from Lemma 1. 
From (4), our hypotheses can be written respectively as 
and 
where we have taken the liberty to delete arguments of u, c, 
and d when they are at their least preferred levels and no 
misunderstanding can result; that is, when xi = x 0 i ' Hence, for 
0 0 instance, u (xl ,x2) and d (xo) will denote u (xo,xl ,x2 ,x3) and 
0 d (xOtx1 ) respectively. 
Substituting (6) into (5) and then (5) into (6) gives us, 
respectively, 
and 
U(X) = u(xO) + c(xO) u(xl) + ~ ( x ~ , x ~ ) [ u ( x ~ )  + ( ~ 3 1  u(x2)1 
(8) 
Equating (8) and (9) with x3 = xo indicates 3 
0 0 Similarly, equating (5) and (6) with xo = xo and x2 = x2 indicates 1 
U(X ) + c(x3) u(xl) = u(xl) + d(xl) ~ ( ~ 3 1  t 3 
which can be rearranged to yield 
c(x3) - 1 d(xl) - 1 
- = k , u(xi) f 0 , i = 1,3, (11) 
u (x,) u (xl 
where k is a constant since (11) has a function of x3 equal to 
a function of xl. If u(xl) = 0, from (lo), it follows that 
d (xl ) = 1 , and similarly c (x ) = 1 when u (x ) = 0. Thus, from 3 3 
(ll), one sees 
and 
Substituting ( 9 ) ,  (121, and (13) into (8) yields 
from which one sees that XI, X2, and X3 are each UI, which con- 
pletes the proof. 
4.  A CHAINING THEOREM 
Roughly speaking, the more utility independence properties 
we can identify, the simpler the assessment of the utility func- 
tion becomes. It is important to specify the simplest functional 
form of the multiattribute utility function consistent with an 
arbitrary set of utility independence assumptions. With this in 
mind, we want to generalize the results of Section 3 by construc- 
ting a "chaining theorem" using Theorem 1 as the building block. 
Definition. A utility independent chain is a collection of sets 
{yl t - I yRI, where (1) Y is UI, j = 1 ,..., R, and (2) there is j 
an ordering of Y1 through YR such that each Y (other than the j 
first in .the ordering) overlaps at least one of its predecessors 
in the ordering. 
We will be interested in finding utility independent chains 
which consist of as many sets as possible. This will allow us 
to exploit the utility independence properties to the fullest 
extent in simplifying the implied functional form of the utility 
function. 
Definition. Let {Y lf...,YJ) be a set such that Y is UI, j 
j = l....,J and let {Y~,...,Y~~, R - < J be a utility independent 
chain. This chain is a maximal utility independent chain if no 
Y j = R + 1, ..., J, overlaps any Y j = jr I 1, ...,R. 
Definition. Let {Y1,Y2, ... ,YR) be a maximal utility independent 
chain. Each Y j j RI partitions X E {x~,X~,...,X~~ into Y jr j 
and T 
1. 
There are 2R possible subsets of X created by taking 
intersections formed with either Y or Y for each j 5 R. Each j R j  
- - 
nonempty intersection, except for n Y is defined to be an 
i = l  j '  J .  
element of the maximal utility independent chain {Y1, ... ,YR1. 
An example should help illustrate our definitions. 
Example. Consider the set x = {x~,x~,....x~), and suppose Y is j 
UI, j = 1,2, ..., 5, where 
Note that Y2 overlaps Y1 so is a utility independent chain. 
Now Y3 is included in Y1 but Y3 does overlap Y2. Thus, {Y1,Y2,Y31 
is another utility independent chain. Checking Y4, we see it is 
included in Y2 and distinct from both Y1 and Y3. Thus, the 
attribute Y4 does not overlap any of Y1, Y2, or Y3, so it does 
not enter the maximal utility independent chain we are constructing. I 
Also Y5 does not overlap any of yl, y2, or y3, implying that the 
collection of sets { Y ~ , Y ~ , Y ~ }  is a maximal utility independent 
chain on X. In addition, Y5 is itself another maximal utility 
independent chain on X. 
To identify the elements of the maximal utility independent I 
chain {Y1,Y2,Y31, we note Y1Y2y3 = {x31, Y1Y2y3 = {x21. y1T2T3 = 
{xll, T1y2T3 = {xqrX51, and Y1y2T3, P1Y2Y3, and T1T2y3 are empty. 
and {x,+,X~}. For the maximal utility independent chain Y5, there 
is the one element {x,, X8 l . 
Let us return to the general caseandstate an important result. 
Theorem 2. Each possible union of the elements in each maximal 
utility independent chain defined on X = {x~,X,,...,X~~ is 
utility independent of its complement in X. 
Gorman [ 4 ]  also proved a result analogous to Theorem 2 con- 
cerning preferential independence using two overlapping subsets as a 
building block. The reason each possible union of elements in 
any maximal utility independent chain is utility independent is 
that it can be constructed from {Y1, ..., YR} by taking unions, 
intersections, and symmetric differences of overlapping UI sub- 
sets and using Theorem 1. A proof of Theorem 2 using utility 
independence assumptions is found in [8]. 
5. RELEVANCE OF THE RESULTS 
-- 
We will remark on two issues: verification of utility 
independence conditions and representation theorems following 
from Theorem 2. 
First, we would often expect that it would be easier to 
verify lower order utility independence conditions. However, 
for some problem structures, it may seem convenient to group 
particular sets of attributes. For instance, if we had several 
attributes arranged in a matrix, columns may represent time 
periods and rows may characterize different features (e.g., 
cost, pollution). If one could justify UI conditions for certain 
columns and rows, Theorem 2 would be directly relevant. 
Second, suppose C1,C2,...,Cm are each maximal utility 
independent chains on {x~,X~,...,X~} such that Xo is not in any 
C. and each Xi, i = 1, ..., n is in exactly one C j = 1, ..., m. 
I j ' 
Then since each C is UI, it follows from results in [6,8] that j 
one can assess u from 
u(x0,x1,. . . ,Xn) = [x0,u1 (cl), U2 (c2), . . . ,um(cm) I 
where X is scalar valued, u is a utility function over the j 
attributes Xi in C and c designates a specific level of the j j 
attributes Xi in C j *  Furthermore, given Theorem 2, it follows 
from a result in [71 that each. u must be of either the additive j 
or multiplicative form in terms of the component utility functions 
over the elements in C j 
In this paper, the implications of arbitrary sets of utility 
independence assumptions have been investigated. Because of the 
complexity of considering preferences for various levels of 
several attributes simultaneously, it is important, if not 
essential, to exploit such independence properties in structuring 
utility functions involving multiple attributes. The interested 
reader will find several applications of decomposition results, 
such as those in this paper, in Keeney and Raiffa 181. 
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